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the effect on the bargaining outcome when agents care about such legitimacy of the policy? We study
this question theoretically and empirically. We show that the median-voter theorem holds in groups that
are ideologically very cohesive and in groups with extreme ideological disagreement. However, in groups
with intermediate ideological disagreement, the median-voter theorem does not hold. This is since, on
the individual level, ideological disagreement with the median has a non-monotonic effect on the policy.
We test our model in a natural experimental setting—U.S. appeals courts—where causal identification is
based on random assignment of judges into judicial panels, each consisting of three judges who rule on
a case. Here judges care about legitimacy of the policy they write because a norm of consensus prevails
and because increased legitimacy reduces the likelihood of the judicial case to be heard by the Supreme
Court. The predicted pattern of how policies depend on the participants’ ideologies are corroborated by
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1 Introduction
We consider, theoretically and empirically, bargaining within groups of agents moti-
vated by ideology. In particular, we study situations in which the choice of whether to support
a policy affects its impact. Consider an agent with some ideological bliss point who needs to
decide whether to support a policy. Suppose further that this decision will not directly affect
whether the policy goes through, but rather its weight: if the agent legitimizes the policy
by supporting it, the value of the policy is amplified. This can capture, for instance, that
the success of the implementation is more likely if there are many signatories or that the
population subject to the policy will take it more seriously. We ask three questions: 1) What
policies would the agent support? 2) How does this affect the policies that are negotiated
by the group? 3) Given this, who gets the right to propose the policy and does it give the
proposer more influence?
We develop a model providing theoretical predictions for these questions. It is kept
as simple as possible containing only the minimal necessary ingredients. The model is based
on multiparty bargaining between three agents.1 The agents have different ideologies. What
they are set to decide is the ideology of a policy, i.e., a Hotelling-style model. The further
away the policy is from an agent, the lower his/her payoff is (in line with models by Cardona
and Ponsati, 2011; Diermeier and Merlo, 2000; Predtetchinski, 2011; Banks and Duggan,
2006; Duggan et al., 2000). This is important, since we don’t want to limit ourselves to
situations where the piece of the pie is fixed (as in Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) but instead to
allow for circumstances where if one agent is better off, not all others are necessarily worse
off. This could capture, for instance, decisions such as which tax rate to set, how strict to be
on abortion, a country’s position in foreign policy, where to place a job-generating industry
etc. We use a very simple protocol of bargaining.2 The agents first vote on who gets to
propose. Then the chosen agent proposes. Finally, the non-proposers decide whether to sign
1In the previous literature this is often referred to as legislative bargaining. It was pioneered by Baron and
Ferejohn (1989). See Eraslan and Evdokimov (2019) for a literature review.
2In particular, it is much simpler than the models by Cardona and Ponsati (2011); Diermeier and Merlo
(2000); Predtetchinski (2011); Banks and Duggan (2006); Duggan et al. (2000).
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the proposal.3 The main innovations of our model compared to the previous literature are
two seemingly small, but crucial, components that embed the idea of legitimizing a policy.
First, an agent gets positive payoff if the policy is near her bliss point, but as the policy
moves away from the agent, her payoff eventually becomes negative. One can think of this
as capturing whether the agent thinks the policy does more good (if equaling or close to her
bliss point) or more harm (if far from the bliss point). Second, payoffs are amplified when
more agents support the policy. These two assumptions are jointly important. When a policy
comes with a positive payoff, endorsing it (thus increasing its legitimacy) increases the gain
from it. Conversely, endorsing a negative policy increases the loss attached to it.4
How ideology of “group” members affects outcomes is hard to study empirically due
to unobservability of individual ideology and since most groups are formed endogenously
(e.g., in a party system, the formation of the parties is endogenous). In the U.S. Courts of
Appeals (U.S. Federal Circuit Courts) we find a setting where groups make ideologically
contentious decisions (Epstein et al. 2013, Chen et al. 2019) and where the two problems are
resolved. First, there exist commonly used and exogenous measures of individual ideology.
Second, assignment to groups is random: for each judicial case, three judges are randomly
assigned to sit together on a panel. Apart from the binary verdict, the panel composes an
“opinion” motivating the verdict. The opinion forms a policy, in the sense that it guides how
to rule on future cases in same-level and lower courts.5
Our theoretical predictions are supported by the empirical analysis. On question
3Our model bears resemblance to a much richer model by Cameron and Kornhauser (2009) that is applied
specifically to collegial courts. In their model there are more agents (to reflect the size of the US Supreme
Court), and beyond choosing policy from a continuum, the agents face a binary choice of verdict. Thus,
many more things can happen in equilibrium. One of the main differences is that in their model agents do
not care about the ideology of the policy unless they sign it, thus they do not have instrumental motives like
in our model, where agents care about the ideology of the policy per se. In that sense, their model is similar
to the expressive motives modeled in Chen et al. (2019). Furthermore, Cameron and Kornhauser (2009)
do not test their predictions empirically. Despite our empirical setting being similar to the setting they are
modeling, we choose to abstract away from many of their complexities to make the model parsimonious
and applicable to other settings too.
4This aspect relates to Gratton et al. (2020) with the main difference being that in their model legitimacy is
exogenous and refers to the leader’s political capital. Their focus is on how the leader uses this legitimacy.
Our paper is concerned with the step before, in endogenously determining the legitimacy of the chosen
policy (or of the leader for that matter). But we abstract from how the legitimacy is used after that.
5Ideology (or personal preferences) has also been documented to play a role in other courts. See, for instance,
Cohen et al. (2015) and Anwar et al. (2018) for recent evidence.
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1, the model predicts that agents will be more inclined to support policies close to their
own bliss point. In our empirical setting, this has already been established by previous
research (Epstein et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2019). On question 3 our model predicts that the
median agent will have the strongest, but not the sole, influence on policy. In many group
constellations the median can play the other agents against each other and get her will fully.
In other constellations, the median will need to compromise. The median’s particular effect
on policy has been corroborated in our empirical setting by previous research (see Cross,
2007; Chen et al., 2019 and, e.g., Ambrus et al. 2015 for a different setting). The novelty
of the current paper, both empirically and theoretically, regards question 2 – how policy is
affected by the quest for legitimacy.. Here our model predicts that the policy will deviate
from the median’s preference in the direction of another agent’s preference when, roughly
speaking, the group’s level of ideological cohesion is intermediate. When all ideologies closely
align (high cohesion), the median gets her will fully since all sign onto her preferred policy.
When the group has strong ideological disagreement (low cohesion), there is no common
ground for a policy to be signed by all, hence the median (endogenously having the most
influence) gets the policy in line with her ideology but attains only few signatures thus low
legitimacy. When the group is at an intermediate level of cohesion, essentially such that
there exist policies that many would sign and such that compromise in return for legitimacy
is in the interest of the median, the policy deviates from the median’s bliss point. The
empirical prediction generated by this pattern is that, as a function of, say, the “rightist”
agent’s ideological distance to the median, the policy is first independent and then increasing
(and finally independent of it again). A similar pattern is predicted for the leftist agent’s
ideology. We test this prediction both non-parametrically (a local polynomial regression)
and using structural-break tests (to find a shift in the policy from first being independent of




Each agent has an ideology score t which is public information. The pool of agents
consists of a continuum of infinitesimal agents with a unidimensional continuous distribution
of ideology scores F (t) over a range T . For each case, three agents (called L, M and R, where
ideology goes from lowest to highest score) are randomly and independently drawn from the
pool of agents to sit together in a group. With some abuse of notation we let L ≤ M ≤ R
also denote the ideology score of agents.
The timing of the actions within a group is as follows. First, agents vote on who will
get to propose a policy. Second, the proposer proposes a policy v ∈ R. Third, the two other
agents decide simultaneously whether to sign the policy or not. The proposer automatically
signs the policy upon proposing it.
An agent cares about the ideology of the policy and about its legitimacy, as reflected
by the number of agents signing it. To capture this, we let the payoff of agent t be given by
(1) u (t, v) =

[c− |t− v|]λn−2 if n ≥ 2
−K if n < 2
,
where n ∈ {1, 2, 3} is the number of agents signing policy v and λ > 1 is the legitimacy
attributed to the policy. The payoffs are depicted in Figure 1. On top of preferring to minimize
|t− v|, an agent wishes to increase the legitimacy of policies she is happy with (|t− v| ≤ c)
and decrease the legitimacy of policies she is unhappy with (|t− v| > c). The legitimacy
attributed to opinion v will be denoted by λ (v). The term −K represents the outside option
in case no agreement is reached. We assume here that the panel has to reach majority
agreement, hence that −K is sufficiently negative so that it is lower than the lowest possible
payoff under agreement (like in many legislative bargaining models such as Cardona and









For convenience in presentation we adopt the convention that in the voting stage, in
case an agent is indifferent between letting M or some other agent propose, she votes for M,
and that if an agent is indifferent between signing or not, she signs. We solve the game with
backward induction.
2.1 Period 3: When does an agent sign?
From the payoff function it immediately follows that, in a subgame starting in period
3, an agent will sign policies that are sufficiently close to her bliss point (|t− v| ≤ c). If the
policy is far (|t− v| > c), the agent will sign it only if precisely one other agent is signing in
the equilibrium of the subgame (since not signing would yield −K). Thus trivially follows
Lemma 1 (all the formal proofs can be found in the appendix).
Lemma 1 The best response of an agent t in the third period is to sign a policy if |t− v| ≤ c
or if only one other agent is signing. In a pure-strategy SPE, 1) two agents sign if, given v,
maxt∈{L,M,R} |t− v| > c; 2) three agents sign if |t− v| ≤ c for all agents.
The empirical prediction following this lemma is simple: agents are more likely to sign
and endorse policies that are closer to their ideal points.6
6This is even more likely to be the case if we refine the equilibrium concept to be correlated, i.e., in case the
two non-proposing agents have |t− v| > c, the one with the larger |t− v| is not signing (which is sensible).
This refinement is not necessary for any of our results.
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2.2 Period 2: Which policies do agents propose?
Which policy an agent would propose, given the chance, depends on the number of
signatures she expects to get. Following Lemma 1, the proposer can ensure at least two
signatures for any policy. Of course, if only two signatures are attainable, proposing v = t is
the best option and yields payoff u (t, v) = c. Improving upon this payoff can only be done
by ensuring more signatures. The proposer will be willing to propose v 6= t if and only if
such a proposal yields
(2) [c− |t− v|]λ ≥ c ⇔ |t− v| ≤ c− c/λ.
Denote the set of policies that fulfill this inequality when the proposer is t by Vt, and
denote by V3 the set of proposals that all three agents would sign, i.e. v∈ V3 if and only if
maxt∈{L,M,R} |t− v| ≤ c.
Lemma 2 A proposer t will propose the v ∈ Vt ∩ V3 that minimizes |t− v|. If Vt ∩ V3 = ∅,
t will propose v = t and only two agents will sign.





1 − 1/𝜆 𝑐
𝑐
Comparing the range of policies over which the proposer is willing to compromise
with the range over which other agents are willing to sign (Lemma 1 and Figure 2), we get
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a first notion of the bargaining power of the proposer: the proposer is willing to deviate at
most c−c/λ from the bliss point while non-proposers are willing to sign policies at a distance
c. From these ranges of compromise also follows that the proposed policy will depend on the
combination of bliss points in the group, as will be outlined in the next two subsections. The
results also depend on who the proposer is. There are two qualitatively different cases: when
M proposes and when someone else proposes.
2.2.1 Median proposer
Let v∗t denote the equilibrium proposal of agent t. The following proposition outlines
the different cases under a median proposer.
Proposition 1 Suppose M is the proposer. Then:
1. If R−M ≤ c and M − L ≤ c then v∗M = M and all agents sign.
2. If c < R−M ≤ 2c− c/λ and R− L ≤ 2c then v∗M = R− c and all agents sign.
3. If c < M − L ≤ 2c− c/λ and R− L ≤ 2c then v∗M = L+ c and all agents sign.
4. Otherwise, v∗M = M and only two agents sign.
The results of the proposition are shown graphically in Figure 3. The intuition behind it is
as follows. The median, being the proposer, has bargaining power. She knows she will attain
at least one more signature, except for her own. The question then is which compromise is
needed to attain the last signature and whether it is worth it. There are essentially three
main cases.
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Either both the other agents are close enough to be willing to sign the median’s bliss
point. In this case, represented by point 1 in the proposition, the median does not need
to compromise. This is the grey box on the lower left in Figure 3. Alternatively, the other
two agents are at an intermediate distance from the median and each other, represented by
points 2 and 3 in the proposition. Here one of them is not close enough for both to sign the
median’s bliss point. The median then has to compromise to achieve a unanimously endorsed
policy. How much to compromise? Just enough to make the further-away agent sign (hence
v∗M = R−c if this agent is R and v∗M = L+c if this agent is L) without losing the signature of
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the other agent (hence the condition R−L ≤ 2c in points 2 and 3).7 This case is represented
by the white regions in Figure 3. Finally, if three signatures are not attainable, or the cost
of getting the third signature is too high for M, then M just settles for two signatures by
proposing her bliss point. This is represented by the grey region in the upper right in Figure
3.
Towards presenting the result that we will use for empirically testing our model, we
present the following corollary that follows from Proposition 1 (we pose the corollary in
terms of how v∗M depends on R, equivalent statements can be made on how it depends on
L).
Corollary 1 v∗M as a function of R has the following properties:
1. If M − L > 2c− c/λ, v∗M= M is constant and independent of R.




for R ≤ L+ 2c
for R > L+ 2c
, i.e., v∗M (R) is constant
for a non-zero range, then discontinuously jumps up and is constant thereafter.





for R ≤ M + c
for M + c<R ≤ min{M + 2c− c/λ, L+ 2c}
for R > min{M + 2c− c/λ, L+ 2c}
, i.e.,
v∗M (R) is constant for a non-zero range, then increasing and then discontinuously drops
and is constant thereafter.
While Corollary 1 makes it clear that the pattern of v∗M (R) depends on the value of
M − L, one might observe that the different cases listed in the corollary share some clear
similarities: when R − M is small, v∗M (R) is constant; then, for larger values of R − M ,
7That is, there are two constraints guiding how far the median is willing to compromise. To see this more
in detail, suppose L is the closer one to M, while R is further away from M. Then compromise is needed in
the direction of R. The first constraint is that the policy cannot be so far right that L is no longer willing
to sign (this is represented by R − L ≤ 2c ⇒ M − L ≤ 2c − (R − M) in point 2). The second is that it
has to be worth it for M to get the third signature, that is, the ideological loss cannot be so large that the
added strength is not enough compensation. This is the constraint R − M ≤ 2c − c/λ in point 2. If this
constraint is not met, the leftmost policy that R is willing to sign (v = R− c) is not in VM . Naturally, once
the third signature is attainable, the median just has to go as far right as needed to make R indifferent
between signing and not, hence choosing v∗M = R− c.
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v∗M (R) might be increasing; and finally, for even larger values of R − M , v∗M (R) might
drop (and stay constant afterwords). This similarity of the different patterns suggests that,
when taking the model to the data, it is be possible to distill clear unified characteristics,
at least for sufficiently small values of R −M . The next proposition presents these unified
characteristics. The thought experiment the proposition performs is the following. Suppose
there is a large number of groups. Now suppose we observe an R at a given distance r from
M in these groups (of three agents each). The question the proposition answers is: how will
the equilibrium policy depend on R−M?
Proposition 2 Define r ≡ R−M ≤ T . Then E [v∗M (r)] has one of the following patterns:
(i) If T < c then E [v∗M (r)] is constant in r.
(ii) If c < T ≤ 2c− c/λ then E [v∗M (r)] is first constant and then increases in r.
(iii) If T > 2c−c/λ then E [v∗M (r)] is first constant, then increases in r and afterwards
it is ambiguous.
Proposition 2 has important implications for our empirical investigation. It basically
implies that the range of possible views (or, if you wish, the size of c relative to this range,
which captures the ideological flexibility of the agents) determines how much of the full
picture will be revealed.8 We emphasize in the proposition the range of types since, when
we go to the data, we do not know how broad the type space is relative to c. Essentially, if
the pool of agents is ideologically very broad (large T relative to c), enabling anything from
very cohesive to very non-cohesive groups, then we are in case (iii). Here, as a function of
r, we should observe policies that are first flat (representing the median getting her will),
then increasing (representing the need to compromise to get the signature of R) and then
ambiguous. If the pool of agents is somewhat more narrow then we are in case (ii). Here
we are predicted to see the same pattern of flat and then increasing policy, but not the
ambiguous part, as very non-cohesive groups cannot be formed. Finally, if the pool is narrow
(point (i)), then all groups are necessarily cohesive, implying that we will only observe the
flat part. An equivalent prediction can be stated by instead increasing the distance from L
8Note that, theoretically, the function E [v∗M (r)] is not defined for r > T .
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to M. Then the pattern is flat, then falling then ambiguous.
2.2.2 Non-median proposer
We move now to analyze which policy a non-median would propose. For brevity
we will focus the description and intuition on L as proposer (corresponding results can be
obtained for R as proposer). The following proposition outlines the different cases.
Proposition 3 Suppose L is the proposer.
1. If R− L ≤ c then v∗L = L and all agents sign.
2. If c < R− L ≤ 2c− c/λ then v∗L = R− c and all agents sign.
3. If R− L > 2c− c/λ then v∗L = L and only two agents sign.









The results of the proposition are depicted in Figure 4 and its intuition rests on a
similar, but simpler, intuition as that for when M is the proposer. L is willing to compromise
with the policy if it is needed to get all three signatures and if it is worth it in the sense that
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reduction in the value of the policy is small enough to be worth the extra signature. When
all agents are close to each other (point 1 in the proposition) then all would sign L’s bliss
point so no compromise is needed. When R is at an intermediate distance (point 2) then it
is necessary to compromise to get R’s signature and it is worth it for L since the compromise
is not too large. Finally when R is far from L (point 3) then a compromise is necessary to
get a signature but it is not worth it for L.
2.3 Period 1: Who gets to propose?
We move now to the final step of the analysis: determining who gets chosen to be
proposer in the first period of the game. We emphasize that one can think of several other
ways than the one assumed here for how a proposer is chosen, but the qualitative results
for how the policy is determined by the proposer (as outlined in the results thus far) is the
same. In the simple method we examine here, we assume that in Period 1 the agents vote,
in pairwise comparisons, for who gets to propose. In case of a draw, one of the agents is
picked at random to be the proposer. To determine who wins that vote we need to analyze
the payoffs for the agents under the different proposers.
Lemma 3 For any distribution of L, M and R, there always exist two agents who have a
weakly higher payoff with M as proposer than with any other proposer.
The intuition for this lemma is very simple. First, naturally, M is always better off
with herself as proposer. This is straightforward since when M gets to propose, she can always
propose a policy that mimics that of another potential proposer or propose something even
better.9 Second, R always gets a higher payoff with M as proposer than with L. The reason
is that M is more willing to compromise in the direction of R than L is, and since the
fallback of the proposer simply proposing her bliss point is better for R under M. Given the
lemma, under pairwise comparisons (with a convention of voting for M when indifferent) the
following trivially follows.
9Note however that under some ideological constellations M would propose the same ideology as L, making
M (and in fact everyone else as well) indifferent between the two. This is why the lemma states a weak
preference. Who they vote for in such a situation, M or L, obviously does not have an effect on the predicted
policy. Likewise there are ideological constellations where M and R would choose the same policy if they
get to propose.
13
Proposition 4 Under pairwise comparisons, M wins the right to propose.
This voting procedure thus gives M the right to propose, implying that the empirical
predictions for the questions we outline in the introduction are: 1) agents sign policies close
to their bliss point (Lemma 1); 2) the policy as a function of R should follow the shape
outlined in Proposition 2; 3) M has stronger bargaining power than the others (Lemma 2).
3 Identification and data
3.1 Institutional background and empirical strategy
We use as our laboratory the U.S. federal courts, where it is frequently seen that
judges have the power to stymie executive orders from the U.S. president from taking place.
The courts operate in a hierarchy. At the lowest level are the 94 District Courts (there are
up to 4 Districts in a state). Here, cases first come to trial and there is a jury deciding issues
of fact and a judge deciding issues of law. If there is an appeal, it goes up to one of the
12 Circuit Courts. There are up to 9 states in a Circuit (the name comes from the fact the
judges used to ride on a horse in a “circuit” to reach the entire jurisdiction). If there is an
appeal from here, the case goes to the U.S. Supreme Court, which handles very few cases,
so the Circuit Courts determine the majority of what sets precedent in this common law
system.10
Judges in the Circuit Courts have life-tenure and are appointed by the U.S. President
and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Each Circuit Court consists of a pool of 8-40 judges sitting
in different duty stations in different states across the Circuit. For each case, three judges
are randomly chosen to form the panel that rules on the case.11 This panel is the equivalent
of the group in our model. The three judges in the panel decide a binary verdict (affirming
10The federal courts get almost 400,000 cases per year, but only 100 reach the Supreme Court, so the Circuit
Courts (taking roughly 67,000 cases per year) are responsible for the majority of precedent-setting cases,
cases which law students are reading, as they learn about this high-stakes common-law space, where judges
can introduce theories, shift standards or thresholds, and rule on the constitutionality of states’ laws.
11The assignment of judges in Circuit Courts fall into two categories: 1) Once a case arrives, three randomly
chosen judges are assigned to the case; 2) Once a year, the calendar is randomly set up in advance
determining which judges will sit in which panels on which days in the upcoming year, and when a case
comes up it gets assigned to the next panel. It is well established and has been thoroughly tested that
both procedures are indeed random (see e.g. Chen and Sethi (2011), Berdejo and Chen (2016) and Chen
(2016)).
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or overturning the lower court verdict), where a majority of two judges is needed to set the
verdict. They also compose an opinion (i.e., a text) motivating the verdict. The opinion
(the equivalent of the policy in our theory) serves as precedent for future cases and as such
has a large impact on society and policy. Furthermore, being a text, the opinion can reflect
the assertiveness of the panel and its ideological composition. Our empirical strategy rests
on two key ingredients: 1) judges do not choose whom to interact with; and 2) our measure
of their ideology is (reasonably) correct. Point 1 is guaranteed by the random assignment
(as explained above) and Point 2 is motivated in the next subsection.
3.2 Data and main variables
We use an ideology score that leverages the nature of the judicial appointment pro-
cess. It is a standard summary measure coming from the Judicial Common Space database
(Epstein et al. 2007) that was first coded by Giles et al. (2001). Many papers have used this
score (e.g. Peresie 2005 and Kim 2009). The general idea is that—given that vacancies are
rare and that Circuit Courts have a substantial impact on policy—the appointing politicians
take the opportunities they get to assign judges of their ideological liking. Moreover, there is
a norm of senatorial courtesy by the President. The score is therefore constructed as follows.
If a judge is appointed from a state where the President and at least one home-state Senator
are of the same party, the nominee is assigned the score of the home-state Senator (or the
average of the home-state Senators if both members of the delegation are from the Presi-
dent’s party).12 If neither home-state Senator is of the President’s party, the judge receives
the score of the appointing President. The score thus assumes that the President does favors
to senators from the same party while ignoring the preferences of senators from the other
party. The score has two additional main advantages. First, it is exogenous since (unlike
common measures of Supreme Court judges’ ideology based on their votes or the clerks they
hire) it assigns the ideology of the judge before her behavior at the court is observed, thus
enabling us to identify how panels’ decisions are affected by the ideology of their members.
12The scores of the Senators are located in a two-dimensional space on the basis of the positions that they
take in roll-call votes, but only the first of the two dimensions is salient for most purposes. The ideology
scores of Presidents are then estimated along this same dimension based on the public positions that they
take on bills before Congress.
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The second main advantage of this score is its high ability to predict judges’ voting patterns
in court, as established by Chen et al. (2019). The ideology score takes values in between
roughly ±0.8 (see Appendix Figure 7 for a histogram of the distribution of ideology scores
in our data).
To measure the ideological color of the opinions, we also employ the U.S. Courts of
Appeals Database Project, a random sample of roughly 5% of appeals-courts decisions from
1925 to 2002.13 This database includes hand-coded information on the ideological content of
each coded opinion (liberal = -1, conservative = 1, and mixed or unable to code = 0), to
which we will refer as Opinion Ideology.14 To enable testing the predictions in Proposition
2 we calculate the Score Relative to Center of Panel, which is positive when the judge
is more conservative than the median and negative when the judge is more liberal than the
panel median.15
4 Empirical Results
Our first empirical prediction is Lemma 1, which predicts that agents will be more
inclined to sign policies close to their own bliss point. In our empirical setting, this has been
established by previous research (Epstein et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2019; see also Wahlbeck
et al. 1999, Spriggs et al. 1999 and Hettinger et al. 2004). Our second empirical prediction
is Proposition 4 and Lemma 2, which jointly predict that the median agent will have the
strongest—though not the sole—influence on policy. This holds also in our empirical setting,
as reported in previous research (see Cross, 2007; Chen et al., 2019 and, e.g., Ambrus et al.
2015 for a different setting). The main and novel prediction—both empirically and theoret-
ically—is Proposition 2. We turn now to examine the empirical evidence for this prediction.
13Documentation and data available at http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm.
14The Appeals Court Database Project states that for most issue categories, these will correspond to con-
ventional notions of “liberal” and “conservative”. The directionality codes parallel closely the directionality
codes in the Spaeth Supreme Court database.
15Any analysis requiring the panel median includes only panels where there are no tied or missing scores
(panels with tied scores are excluded because the identity of the median judge is not uniquely determined).
All results presented in the paper are robust to including also tied scores.
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4.1 Moving from Median: Flat, then Increasing
According to Proposition 2, we should see that holding constant the ideology of M and
L while increasing R, there is no movement of the opinion ideology for moderate distances
between R and M. This is so because M sees no reason to compromise to gain R’s vote.
However, as the distance grows to an intermediate distance, the other judges will compromise
a bit in order to maintain the legitimacy of the opinion (e.g. the opinion will move in the
direction of R when R moves further away from M).16 We again emphasize that since the
range of judge ideologies relative to their flexibility (c) is not observable, we do not know
whether we should see only the flat part or also the increasing part predicted. What we do
know is that we should not (if the model is correct) observe any other pattern, e.g., it should
not be increasing right away.
We analyze these predictions in the data in two ways. In this sub-section, Figure 5
presents a separate analysis for judges on the left of the other two panelists and an analysis
of judges on the right of the other two panelists. The left figure presents a local polynomial
estimator for the relation between two variables. One variable is whether the outcome is
a conservative opinion. The second variable is the left judge’s score relative to the panel
center, controlling for the scores of the center judge and the right judge. Both variables
are residualized on circuit-by-year fixed effects. We see that as the left judge becomes more
distant and reaches an intermediate distance away from the other two judges, the opinion
is more reflective of the left judge’s ideology. The right figure presents the same pattern
for the right judge. These observed patterns align with case (ii) of Proposition 2, implying
an intermediate cohesiveness (or, alternatively, intermediate flexibility) of the judges in the
pool.
16Eventually, when R becomes large the effect on the opinion is ambiguous.
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Score Relative to Center of Panel
Notes: x-axis: Ideology score of a judge demeaned by the median of the panel of judges assigned on the case,
where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the x-axis. y-axis: Opinion ideology, which
is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. The figure presents a local
polynomial regression with an Epanechnikov kernel, where the dependent variable is opinion ideology. The
left sub-figure represents judges on the left of the other two panelists, and the right sub-figure represents
the same for the judges on the right of the other two panelists. Both the x- and y-axis are residualized by
Circuit-by-year fixed effects. The dashed lines depict the 95% confidence interval. Data come from the U.S.
Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database. Sample includes three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores.
4.2 Structural Break Test
In this sub-section, we ask whether the regression coefficient is stable over the range
of judge ideologies. We test whether the data abruptly changes in ways not predicted by
the model by testing for structural breaks in the residuals. Under the null hypothesis of no
structural break, the cumulative sum of residuals will have mean zero. Inference is based
on a sequence of sums of recursive residuals (in time series, this would be a “one-step-
ahead forecast error”) computed iterately from nested subsamples of the data. Values of the
sequence outside an expected range suggest a structural change in the model.
Figure 6 presents the raw data in bins for all the judges pooled together (a single
observation is a judge in a panel, where each dot represents the average of all opinions in
a bin of judges with similar ideology scores relative to the panel median). A slope becomes
visible to the left and right of the vertical lines. Table I presents a formal test for structural
breaks at these vertical lines using the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. Panel A
reports tests where the x-axis is divided into 20 evenly spaced units, and Panel B reports
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the same for 40 units. In each panel, the first row reports a statistically significant structural
break that exists somewhere over the entire range of the x-axis. The second and third rows
investigate parameter stability for negative and positive values of the x-axis, respectively. In
line with the visualization provided in Figure 6, the structural break is estimated at around
20% from the end on both sides: for the analysis with 20 bins, a trend break statistically
significant at the 1% level is observed on both the left and on the right, at 7 bins distance
from the center. For the analysis with 40 bins, a trend break is statistically significant at the
1% level for the right but only the 5% level for the left, at 16 bins to the right and 10 to the
left from the center.17
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Score Relative to Center of Panel
Notes: x-axis: Ideology score of a judge demeaned by the median of the panel of judges assigned on the
case, where relatively more conservative scores are along the right on the x-axis. y-axis: Opinion ideology,
which is coded as 1 for conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. Each dot represents
the average of all opinions in a bin of judges with similar ideology scores. The lines represent the linear fit
for a section of the data. Data come from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5%
Sample). Ideology scores come from the Judicial Common Space database. Sample includes three-judge
panels where there are no tied or missing scores.
17The parameter stability test for positive values of the x-axis use the cumulative sum of the OLS residuals,
which is more useful for detecting structural breaks on the right-side of the sample.
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TABLE I
Tests for Structural Breaks (Cumulative sum test for parameter stability)
Panel A: 20 Bins Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value
Entire Range 1.08 1.14 0.95 0.85
< 0 1.40 1.14 0.95 0.85
> 0 1.94 1.63 1.36 1.22
Estimated Breaks: 7 and -7 relative to center
Panel B: 40 Bins Test Statistic 1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value
Entire Range 1.50 1.14 0.95 0.85
< 0 1.07 1.14 0.95 0.85
> 0 2.88 1.63 1.36 1.22
Estimated Breaks: 16 and -10 relative to center
Notes: This table reports a cumulative sum test for parameter stability over the x-axis. The test statistic is
constructed from the cumulative sum of the recursive residuals. Panel A investigates reports tests where
the x-axis is divided into 20 evenly spaced units, while Panel B reports the same for 40 units. In each
panel, the first row reports a statistically significant structural break. The second and third rows
investigate parameter stability for negative and positive values of the x-axis, respectively, and the
parameter stability test for positive values of the x-axis use the cumulative sum of the OLS residuals,
which is more useful for detecting structural breaks on the right-side of the sample.
5 Conclusions
We analyze situations in which the choice of whether to support a policy affects its
impact. Our overarching research question is: What is the effect on the bargaining outcome
when agents care about such legitimacy of the decision? The group’s ideological cohesion
has a non-monotonic effect on the policy. When all ideologies closely align (high cohesion),
the median gets her will fully since all agents sign onto such a policy. When the group has
extreme ideological disagreement, there is no common ground for a policy to be signed by
all, hence the median (endogenously having the most influence) gets the policy in line with
her ideology but attains few signatures. Finally, when the group is at an intermediate level
of cohesion, the policy deviates from the median’s bliss point since the median can, and is
willing to, compromise to gain higher legitimacy. This creates a novel empirical prediction
whereby the policy is independent of non-median-members’ ideology in cohesive groups, then
there is a structural break so that at intermediate agreement the policy is increasing in a
non-median’s ideology. We test this prediction in the natural-experimental setting of the US
20
Circuit Courts and find support for it and other predictions of the model.
Naturally, in our ambition to develop a parsimonious and widely useful model, we
have abstracted from many interesting features that have been considered by the theoretical
literature on legislative bargaining that we relate to and by the law literature on the specific
setting of collegial courts. Still, we believe that our model delivers an important lesson that
pertains to many political settings and to the wide topic of group decision making.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof: First, if |t− v| ≤ c, then clearly signing the policy is better for agent t than not signing, giving
the utility function in (1). Hence, since signing is a dominant strategy whenever |t− v| ≤ c, we get that all
three agents sign if |t− v| ≤ c for all three. Second, regardless of the value of t, if only one other agent signs
the policy, then t prefers to sign as well, by the assumption that −K is lower than the lowest possible payoff
under agreement. Hence, if maxt |t− v| > c, a pure SPE is one where only two agents sign (there is no SPE
where all three sign because the agent with maxt |t− v| has a profitable deviation to not signing). Q.E.D.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof: Any v ∈ Vt∩V3 is guaranteed to be signed by all three. The utility of the proposer when proposing
such v is then given by [c− |t− v|]λ, which monotonically decreases in |t− v|. By the definition of Vt, this
utility is larger than the proposer’s utility from any v /∈ Vt. If however Vt ∩V3 = ∅, then, by the definition of
Vt and V3 and by Lemma 1, the proposal of t would be signed only by two agents, in which case t’s utility
is given by c− |t− v|, which is maximized when v = t. Q.E.D.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof: 1) When R −M ≤ c and M − L ≤ c then, following Lemma 1, both R and L would sign v = M
implying, by Lemma 2, that v∗M= M . 2) When c < R − M ≤ 2c − c/λ and M − L ≤ 2c − (R − M) then
R −M > c ≥ M − L hence, by Lemma 1, v = M would yield only two signatures. At the same time, since
M −L ≤ 2c− (R−M) ↔ R−L ≤ 2c and R−M ≤ 2c− c/λ there exist, by Lemmas 1 and 2, another v s.t.
v ∈VM ∩V3. Since R−M > c, by Lemma 1, such v necessarily has v > M . Minimizing, by Lemma 2, |M − v|
among v ∈ VM ∩V3 then implies choosing v∗M = R− c. 3) Follows the same steps as for point 2. 4) Otherwise
VM ∩ V3 = ∅, either because R − L > 2c (implying V3 = ∅), or because max {R−M,M − L} > 2c − c/λ.
The fact that VM ∩ V3 = ∅ implies, by Lemma 2, that v∗M = M and two agents sign. Q.E.D.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof: (i) If max |R− L| = T ≤ c, then, for any t and any v in the range T , we have [c− |t− v|] ≥ 0,
implying that all three agents sign the proposal. Consequently, it is a dominant strategy for M to propose
v = M , in which case v∗M (R) is constant. (ii) If c is such that c < max |R− L| = T ≤ 2c−c/λ,18 then the third
zone of Corollary 1(3), where v∗M drops from R− c to M , is unreachable (because, in that region, c ≥ M −L
and R > min{M + 2c − c/λ, L + 2c} should both hold, but this requires that either R − L > 2c—which is
18This part is best understood by looking at Figure 3 and focusing on the simplex whose edges are
(0, 0) , (2c− c/λ, 0) , (0, 2c− c/λ).
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impossible given that T ≤ 2c− c/λ < 2c—or max |R− L| ≤ 2c− c/λ < R−M , which is impossible as well).
Similarly, the second zone of Corollary 1(2) is unreachable too, because it requires R − L > 2c. Hence, in
any of the three possible regions of M − L (as defined in Corollary 1), v∗M is either constant (at M in the
first region and at L + c in the second), or is weakly increasing (discontinuously for every pair of {Li,Mi}
in the third region for which r crosses c, and continuously for every such pair when r continues to increase
beyond c and v∗M = R − c). (iii) From a theoretical point of view there are two subcases here. The first
subcase is when c is such that 2c− c/λ ≤ max |R− L| = T ≤ 2c.19 In this case—like in case (2) above—the
second zone of Corollary 1(2) is unreachable. Furthermore, the only way to reach the third zone of Corollary
1(3), where v∗M = M because R > min{M + 2c − c/λ, L + 2c}, is that R −M > 2c − c/λ (see also Figure
3). Hence, for pairs of {Li,Mi} in the first and second regions v∗M is constant (at M in the first region and
at L + c in the second), while in the third region v∗M is constant until r = c. When r reaches c, the only
relevant pairs of {Li,Mi} are in the third region, and for all of them v∗M is increasing discontinuously when
r crosses c and then continuously when r continues to increase beyond c (where v∗M = R− c). This continues
till r reaches the point where r = R − M = 2c − c/λ. At that point, v∗M drops (for all remaining pairs of
{Li,Mi}) from R− c = M + c− c/λ to M , and stays there. The second subcase is when T > 2c, hence any




is constant, because in each of the
three possible regions v∗M stays constant. Then, when r is in the range [c/λ, c], v∗M weakly increases (due to
discontinuous “jumps” in the second region, where v∗M switches from L− c to M). At r = c there is another
discontinuous increase, due to v∗M switching from M to R − c for all pairs of {Li,Mi} that are in the third





continues to increase, but there are pairs of {Li,Mi} (also in the third region) for
which v∗M discontinuously drops from R− c to M , which explains why, overall, the pattern is ambiguous at
this stage. Finally, after r crosses the point where it equals 2c − c/λ, v∗M drops (for all remaining pairs of
{Li,Mi}) from R− c = M + c− c/λ to M , and stays there. Q.E.D.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof: 1) When R−L ≤ c (implying also M −L ≤ c ) then, by Lemma 1 all agents sign v = L, hence by
Lemma 2 this is the proposed policy.
2) When c < R − L then, by Lemma 1, only two agents would sign v = L. At the same time there
exists v ∈ VL that all would sign since R−L ≤ 2c− c/λ. Hence, by Lemma 2, L chooses the v that is closest
to herself in VL, this is v∗L = R− c.
3) When R − L > 2c − c/λ then, by Lemma 1, there exist no v ∈ VL that would be signed by all,
hence by Lemma 2, L proposes v∗L = L . Q.E.D.
19This part is best understood by looking at Figure 3 and focusing on the simplex whose edges are
(0, 0) , (2c, 0) , (0, 2c).
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A.6 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof: Proposition 3 states that when L proposes, either (1) v∗L = L or (2) v∗L = R− c. In case (1), given
Proposition 1, we have v∗L = L ≤ v∗M ≤ R, implying that v∗M is closer to R than v∗L is.20 This also guarantees
a higher payoff for R when M rather than L proposes, unless one of the following two (soon-to-be-ruled-out)
scenarios holds: (i) R−c < v∗L = L < v∗M ≤ R (so that R has a positive payoff from both v∗L and v∗M ) and the
signatures are such that v∗L = L gets three signatures while v∗M gets only two, or (ii) v∗L = L < v∗M < R − c
(so that R has a negative payoff from both v∗L and v∗M ) and the signatures are such that v∗L = L gets two
signatures while v∗M gets three. However, (i) is impossible because R− c < L < v∗M ≤ R implies further that
v∗M < L+ c, hence would be signed by all three agents and not only by two as wrongly asserted; and (ii) is
impossible because v∗M < R− c implies that R might sign v∗M only if L does not, implying it cannot get three
signatures, again as wrongly asserted. Finally, if case (2) holds, so that v∗L = R − c (and so R gets a zero
payoff), then it must be—by Proposition 3—that R − L ≤ 2c − c/λ, implying also that R −M ≤ 2c − c/λ
and M − L ≤ 2c− c/λ. Hence, by Proposition 1, we know that all three agents sign v∗M , implying R gets a
positive payoff. Q.E.D.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof: The proposition trivially follows from Lemma 3. Q.E.D.
20Recall that v∗M ∈ {L+ c,M,R− c}. We know that if v∗M = R− c then it must be that L < R− c, because
Proposition 1 states that v∗M = R − c only if M < R − c, in which case also L < R − c; and we know
that if v∗M = L + c then it must be that L + c < R because Proposition 1 states that v∗M = L + c only if
L+ c < M , in which case also L+ c < R.
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Vote-Level Mean Standard Deviation
Dissent 0.03 0.17
Concur 0.02 0.13
Ideology Score 0.01 0.34
N 541182
Case-Level (Songer-Auburn sample)
Opinion Ideology (1 = Conservative) 0.19 0.90
Panel Median 0.33 0.47
Ideology Score -0.03 0.34
N 7677
Number of Judges per Circuit-Year 16.95 9.65
Number of Circuit-Years 667
Notes: Data on dissents and concurrences comes from OpenJurist (1950-2007). Data on opinion ideology
come from the U.S. Courts of Appeals Database Project (1925-2002 5% Sample). Sample includes
three-judge panels where there are no tied or missing scores. Opinion ideology is coded as 1 for
conservative, 0 for mixed or not applicable, and -1 for liberal. Ideology scores come from the Judicial
Common Space database (Epstein et al. 2007), which provides a summary measure using the voting
patterns of the appointing President and home-state Senators.
B.2 Distribution of ideological scores
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Notes: Ideology scores from the Judicial Common Space database (Epstein et al. 2007).
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